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bColby College, Waterville, USASummary.— We use OLS and logistic regression to investigate variation in husband and wife perspectives on the division of authority
over agriculture-related decisions within households in rural Tanzania. Using original data from husbands and wives (interviewed sep-
arately) in 1,851 Tanzanian households, the analysis examines diﬀerences in the wife’s authority over 13 household and farming deci-
sions. The study ﬁnds that the level of decision-making authority allocated to wives by their husbands, and the authority allocated
by wives to themselves, both vary signiﬁcantly across households. In addition to commonly considered assets such as women’s age
and education, in rural agricultural households women’s health and labor activities also appear to matter for perceptions of authority.
We also ﬁnd husbands and wives interviewed separately frequently disagree with each other over who holds authority over key farming,
family, and livelihood decisions. Further, the results of OLS and logistic regression suggest that even after controlling for various indi-
vidual, household, and regional characteristics, husband and wife claims to decision-making authority continue to vary systematically by
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authority (i.e., a lack of ‘‘intra-household accord”) over diﬀerent farm and household decisions is problematic for interventions seeking
to use survey data to develop and inform strategies for reducing gender inequalities or empowering women in rural agricultural house-
holds. Findings provide policy and program insights into when studies interviewing only a single spouse or considering only a single
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Except for the rare couple that shares common preferences
and equal access to resources and information, the distribu-
tion of decision-making authority between spouses can be
expected to aﬀect the allocation of household resources. 1
Scholars seeking to understand these intra-household dynam-
ics have generated a rich literature on the broader measures,
determinants, and household consequences of spousal bar-
gaining power and decision-making (Doss, 2013; Kebede,
Tarazona, Munro, & Verschoor, 2013; Malapit &
Quisumbing, 2014). These household dynamics are important
to resource allocation in many contexts, and certainly in low
resource, high risk, and relatively isolated environments with
strong gender norms, such as arise in many rural parts of
the developing world.
Since the 1980s the concept of women’s status has expanded
from solely encompassing education and socio-economic
levels to explicitly including women’s access to and control
over resources and most recently, empowerment (Kabeer,
1999; Malhotra & Schuler, 2005; Mason, 1986, 2005;
Mosedale, 2005). 2 Although deﬁnitions vary, to be ‘‘empow-
ered” is to have the rights, capacity, and assets to be able to
make choices (Ibrahim & Alkire, 2007; and see Alkire,
Meinzen-Dick, Peterman, Quisumbing, and Seymour (2013)
for a fuller discussion). Intra-household bargaining power is
one component of empowerment, for which decision-making
authority is used as an indicator (Doss, 2013; Heckert &
Fabric, 2013; Kabeer, 2001; Mason, 2005). We refer the reader
to recent excellent reviews in Kebede et al. (2013), Doss (2013),169and Malapit and Quisumbing (2014) for a more thorough dis-
cussion of intra-household bargaining and decision-making
processes. Our own focus is on the measurement of women’s
bargaining power, including how indicators of women’s
intra-household authority vary across husband and wife self-
reports, and across multiple household decisions, particularly
as such variation might inform policy and development inter-
ventions in a rural developing country context.
Understanding how farm households allocate intra-
household authority is diﬃcult given the paucity of data on
key rural household decisions and decision-making processes.
In this paper we use original data that show how perceived
authority over multiple household and farm management
decisions in rural Tanzania varies by spouse. In so doing we
contribute to the literature on intra-household decision-
making in two ways. First, while the existing literature mostly
tests decision-making authority within a particular domain of
decisions as a function of spousal characteristics such as age
and education, our data cover 13 diﬀerent farm household
decisions, and include important farm household co-variates
such as health and the division of labor among market, farm,
and home. This allows us to examine the role of decision-
maker characteristics across multiple decisions for the same
household. Second, while existing empirical work is largely
restricted to a single spouse’s account of decision-making
authority and assumes the reported division of authority is
understood by both spouses, our household survey is based
on a relatively large random sample of farm households,Final revision accepted: September 26, 2016
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same questions of both spouses separately. This allows us to
examine both husband and wife claims to decision-making
authority and the incidence of accord and discord over those
claims. In cases of discord, we posit that policy and develop-
ment interventions may be misplaced if they are targeted based
on analyses using decision-making reports from a single
spouse.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy
review the literature on intra-household decision-making.
Though our work is not designed to add to debates on the out-
comes of decision-making authority, this literature provides
the foundation for our empirical work, particularly studies
focused on the determinants of decision-making authority
and challenges to the unitary household model. Section 3
describes our data and methods, and we present our original
ﬁndings in Section 4, using survey responses from a random
sample of couples in Tanzania across 13 diﬀerent agricultural
and household decisions. We ﬁnd a husband’s allocation of
decision-making authority to his wife varies according to his
wife’s age and education, consistent with hypotheses that hav-
ing greater assets (in terms of human or physical capital) can
oﬀer better exit options for women and thereby increase their
decision-making power. Novel, however, is our ﬁnding that
for rural women for whom farming is the main livelihood,
health status also matters, as does the relative amount of time
the husband contributes to home labor. Findings also suggest
that, on average, intra-household accord over which spouse
holds decision-making authority is more likely in households
where women have higher levels of education. But accord is
lower in households where the woman is more active in market
labor—in such cases the wife’s higher self-perception of
decision-making authority is not matched by the husband’s
perception (contrary to some ﬁndings for urban settings;
e.g., Bertocchi, Brunetti, and Torricelli (2014) suggest market
access increases women’s household authority from the per-
spective of both spouses). Overall our empirical investigation
suggests that analyses based on population-level male and
female averages may mask signiﬁcant husband-wife diﬀerences
of opinion over who holds decision-making authority within
households. In cases of husband-wife discord, diﬀerent devel-
opment eﬀorts to increase women’s authority and ultimate
empowerment might be recommended depending on whether
the wife or the husband is interviewed. Section 5 concludes.2. INTRA-HOUSEHOLD BARGAINING AND
DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY
The relationship between intra-household decision-making
authority, resource allocations, and positive outcomes for
women and children has been observed in many diﬀerent cul-
tural and economic contexts. In India, for example, increased
women’s authority relative to their husbands’ is associated
with increased use of modern contraception and to declines
in infant and child mortality (Jejeebhoy, 2002). Similar repro-
ductive, maternal, neo-natal, and child health outcomes have
been observed in Latin America (Becker, Fonseca-Becker, &
Schenck-Yglesias, 2006), in Africa (e.g., in Egypt (Kishor,
2000) and Mali (Castle, 1993)), and in Southeast Asia
(Beegle, Frankenberg, & Thomas, 2001). Increasing women’s
bargaining power is associated with increased expenditure
shares on key household goods such as health and education,
which can lead to improved child outcomes (see Doepke and
Tertilt (2014) for a comprehensive review). There has also been
a recent and robust examination of nutritional outcomesrelating to women’s household authority across multiple coun-
tries (Haddad, Pena, Nishida, Quisumbing, & Slack, 1996;
Richards, Theobald, George, Kim, Rudert, Jehan, &
Tolhurst, 2013), including Bangladesh (Bhagowalia, Menon,
Quisumbing, & Soundararajan, 2012), Senegal (Le´pine &
Strobl, 2013), Nepal (Malapit, Kadiyala, Quisumbing,
Cunningham, & Tyagi, 2013), and Ghana (Malapit &
Quisumbing, 2014).
Given such evidence of the potential beneﬁts of greater
women’s intra-household authority, a growing body of empir-
ical work in development economics has sought to identify
predictors of women’s bargaining power in the household.
Historically the simplest models of household decision-
making have relied upon a unitary household model
(Bobonis, 2009; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2003). Such models
eﬀectively assume that household members pool household
income and/or that husband and wife preferences can be trea-
ted as homogeneous (or, alternatively, that only the husband’s
preferences are relevant determinants of household resource
allocations). A vast body of scholarship, however, now sug-
gests that husbands’ and wives’ relative intra-household
decision-making authority is highly relevant to resource allo-
cation, that is, most households do not fully pool income
and in many cases spousal preferences are not homogeneous
(Attanasio & Lechene, 2002; Duﬂo, 2003; Duﬂo & Udry,
2004; Haddad, Hoddinott, & Alderman, 1997; Hoddinott &
Haddad, 1995; Lundberg, Pollack, & Wales, 1997;
Balasubramanian, 2013; Richards et al., 2013).
Our analysis draws from theoretical insights oﬀered by var-
ious co-operative and non-co-operative bargaining models
which oﬀer alternative characterizations of intra-household
decision-making processes that may better reﬂect actual pat-
terns of decision-making than a unitary household model.
Co-operative models posit that household bargaining out-
comes are negotiated directly between spouses and that out-
comes rely on each spouse’s relative ability to claim power
and to threaten defection from a less-than-desired negotiation
outcome by invoking an outside option, such as the threat of
spousal sanctions through divorce (Manser & Brown, 1980;
McElroy & Horney, 1981) or non-co-operation within mar-
riage (Chen & Woolley, 2001; Kanbur & Haddad, 1994;
Konrad & Lommerud, 2000; Lundberg & Pollak, 1993).
Non-co-operative models assume independent actions on the
part of both spouses lead to a self-enforcing Nash equilibrium,
which may or may not be Pareto eﬃcient (Lundberg &
Pollack, 1994). 3 One key diﬀerence in co-operative and non-
co-operative models is the stability of the bargaining outcome:
co-operative models are presumed stable in the absence of any
changes to the spouses’ relative bargaining power, while non-
co-operative equilibria may shift as new information about the
spouse’s position and strength becomes available. Results con-
sistent with non-co-operative bargaining models have now
been observed across a range of developing country contexts
(e.g., Katz, 1995; Kebede et al., 2013; Mabsout & Van
Staveren, 2010; Malapit & Quisumbing, 2014; McPeak &
Doss, 2006; Udry, 1996; Castilla & Walker, 2013), emphasiz-
ing the potential for shifts in women’s decision-making
authority to lead to shifts in welfare and other outcomes for
women and households.
In this context, some empirical research has focused on ﬁnd-
ing valid measures of decision-making authority in addition to
measuring outcomes of women’s bargaining power (Agarwal,
1997; Basu, 2006). Most models consider women’s property,
ﬁnancial assets, and engagement in market labor to be key
determinants of women’s authority over household decisions
(Antman, 2014; Attanasio & Lechene, 2002; Bertocchi et al.,
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Miruka, 2014; Quisumbing, 2003; Quisumbing & Maluccio,
2003). Other factors such as age, education, and social and
political assets (Chattopadhyay & Duﬂo, 2004; Duﬂo &
Udry, 2004), spousal communication (Ashraf, 2009), trust
and spousal contributions to the household (Iversen,
Jackson, Kebede, Munro, & Verschoor, 2006), and institution-
ally determined gender norms and ideology (Bradshaw, 2013;
Mabsout & Staveren, 2010) have also been examined. Some of
these factors are predicted to aﬀect the bargaining process
while others may aﬀect relative power via provisioning women
with outside (exit) options (Rubalcava & Thomas, 2000).
Recently, household composition (e.g., presence of children)
has also been hypothesized to shape women’s decision-
making roles (Gummerson & Schneider, 2013) and arguably
also their exit options.
Though we have learned a great deal from this literature,
asset-based models of intra-household decision-making leave
open several unanswered questions, often driven by data con-
straints. First, studies are usually limited to a single or few
household decisions. But real-life households engage in count-
less decisions, and simple asset-based models of spousal nego-
tiating power cannot explain situations where the allocation of
decision-making authority within a single household varies
depending upon what decision is at stake. For example, recent
ﬁndings by Bayudan-Dacuycuy (2013) suggest that the pres-
ence of a spouse’s parents in a household may strengthen
wives’ bargaining power in the Philippines, but the eﬀects
are diﬀerent for daily household decisions versus core house-
hold ﬁnancial decisions. Such ﬁndings suggest previous studies
predicting spousal decision-making authority across a single
decision may have missed meaningful variation in spousal
authority across diﬀerent decisions.
Second, most studies of intra-household decision-making
consider only a single spouse’s report of relative authority.
But data from a single spouse ignores the possibility that hus-
bands or wives may not agree with the other spouse’s assess-
ment of household decision-making authority. This lack of
information on spouses’ relative dispositions toward house-
hold decisions may be an especially serious weakness of past
studies, since household outcomes ultimately depend on the
behavior of two (or more) individuals who may agree or dis-
agree on any speciﬁc course of action. Disagreement over
decision-making authority may particularly aﬀect women,
and if the preponderance of survey respondents are male heads
of households, then gaps in our understanding of women’s
true authority may be particularly acute. Anecdotal evidence
from our ﬁeldwork suggests many husbands report that
decision-making within the household is shared, but when
spouses are asked if this is true, the wives strongly disagree.
Understanding gaps in women’s perceived versus actual
decision-making authority may help explain some adoption
paradoxes in programs targeting women. For example,
Miller and Mobarak (2013) ﬁnd ‘‘that women–who bear dis-
proportionate cooking costs–have stronger preferences for
healthier stoves, but lack the authority to make purchases.
Our ﬁndings suggest that if women cannot make independent
choices about household resource use, public policy may not
be able to exploit gender diﬀerences in preferences to promote
technology adoption absent broader social change.”
The available evidence suggests that discrepancies between
husband and wife reports of household matters may be large:
in a study of couples in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, India
for example, Jejeebhoy (2000, 2002) ﬁnds husbands and wives
diﬀer widely in assessments of the woman’s level of mobility,
her access to economic resources, and her decision-makingauthority. Indeed, for the wife’s involvement in the purchase
of food, major household items, and jewellery, the spouses
gave inconsistent reports in as many as 50% of couples.
Ghuman, Lee, and Smith (2004) analyze similar survey data
from India, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia
and conclude that men and women not only diﬀer in their
assessments of women’s decision-making authority, but in
some cases even have diﬀerent understandings of the ques-
tions, diﬀerentiating between ‘‘having ﬁnal say” and ‘‘having
input” in very diﬀerent ways. Bradshaw (2013) found men
and women in Nicaragua diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their estimates
of women’s household labor contributions, particularly in
rural areas where men dramatically under-value women’s
income-generating activities relative to women’s own self-
reports.
Intra-household discord, or husband-wife discrepancies in
self-reported authority over household decisions, has two
potential implications. First, from a household resource per-
spective discordant couples may suﬀer from ineﬃciencies in
individual and household resource use–if both spouses assume
they have decision-making authority and preferences diﬀer,
eﬀorts could be either duplicative (both spouses do the same
work) or decision-related activities may be neglected (if each
spouse perceives the other as responsible). Second, the pres-
ence of intra-household discord may have important policy
implications; namely, for a given decision if husbands and
wives both claim authority, or both defer authority, the results
of interviewing one or the other spouse about household
decision-making processes (important, among other things,
for targeting development interventions) may lead to erro-
neous conclusions. If the biases present in the results of sur-
veys that only interview one spouse are random, little is to
be gained from worrying about discord. If the biases are not
random, however, then we can potentially learn how to better
target eﬀorts involving intra-household decision-making.3. DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE AND MEASURES
OF INTRA-HOUSEHOLD DECISION-MAKING AND
ACCORD
Our empirical strategy is to take advantage of a new and
unusually rich dataset to inform key outstanding questions
around intra-household decision-making authority. Our ﬁrst
set of estimations begins with a single spouse’s responses:
the husband’s attribution of authority to his wife, denoted
as Wi[Hi]. We test if, and in what manner, our conclusions
about the allocation of intra-household authority diﬀer
depending on which spouse is asked, by considering both hus-
bands’ reports of the wife’s authority Wi[Hi] and wife reports
of her own authority Wi[Wi].
4 We additionally explore
whether authority diﬀerences vary across decisions, possibly
suggesting authority derives from characteristics of the deci-
sions in addition to the more studied spousal characteristics
such as age, education, and ﬁnancial assets. Our second set
of estimations focuses on spousal accord—a measure of the
degree to which the husband and wife in household i agree
on relative decision-making authority—to look at those deci-
sions where spousal perspective does matter (that is, where
Wi[Hi]  Wi[Wi] – 0), and for which conclusions and policy
recommendations would hence diﬀer depending on which
spouse was consulted.
Data were collected in October, 2010 by the East African
oﬃce of TNS Research International. Respondents are a
random national sample of 1,851 Tanzanian rural smallholder
households, with ‘‘smallholder” deﬁned locally though
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primary crops including maize, beans, cassava, and rice. 5
Local enumerators used a probability proportional to size sam-
pling approach with the ward (the smallest administrative unit
in Tanzania) as the sampling point. Working from the national
population census for Tanzania and eliminating Zanzibar and
urban sampling points, approximately 300 wards were dis-
tributed across 102 districts in proportion to population size.
Within wards, households were selected using the random walk
technique. Because the survey was restricted to mainland rural
smallholders and our sub-sample is only households with a
married male head (excluding female-headed households or
households in which another male, such as a relative, has
assumed the role of head-of-household), our sample is not
nationally representative. The survey questionnaire was pre-
tested locally several times and gathered information on house-
hold characteristics including demographics of all household
members and detailed information on farming practices.
A key objective of the survey was to identify psychographic
characteristics of farmers in order to develop agricultural
interventions that could target farmers based on their underly-
ing motivations and attitudes toward farming. The male and
female primary decision-makers were deﬁned for enumerators
as ‘‘the adult person who is responsible for the organization
and care of the household or who is regarded as such by the
members of the household.” The male head of household
answered all questions in the survey, while both spouses sepa-
rately answered a subset of questions that included personal
information, attitudes toward farming and risk, and percep-
tions of decision-making authority. To reduce response bias,
especially originating from cultural norms or expectations,
spouses were interviewed separately, and individually.
The reported allocation of household decision-making
authority is assessed through 13 questions about household
and farm activity areas. Each respondent was asked to allocate
10 beans between the husband and wife to reﬂect each individ-
ual’s relative decision-making authority over a given decision.
Questions were worded as follows:
Thinking of yourself and your spouse, how is household
decision-making shared between the two? I am giving you 10
beans and I want you to share them between yourself and your
spouse according to the power each has in making the deci-
sion.
(a) Farm and cash decisions
 What crops to cultivate in the farm?
 Where to sell cash crops?
 When to sell oﬀ livestock?
 How to spend cash from the sale of cash crops?
 How to spend cash from the sale of livestock?
(b) Decisions about children
 What foods to feed the family?
 Whether to send children to school?
(c) Innovation decisions
 Whether to buy a new high-yield seed variety or use the
ordinary seeds?
 Whether to buy new farm equipment or stay with the old
tools?
 What types of information or training the household
needs?
 Who to attend farm training?(d) Broad decision-making authority: livelihood versus overall
 What happens in the farm generally?
 Overall decision-making for the household?
Husbands and wives were interviewed separately to ensure
spouses did not inﬂuence each other’s allocations. Each
respondent was also required to allocate all 10 beans between
him or herself and the spouse. For example, if a husband
assigned himself 7 beans for authority over what happens on
the farm generally, he had to assign the remaining 3 beans
to his wife. Third-party decision-makers, such as in-laws,
brothers and so forth, were not eligible for consideration.
Alternately, the respondent could state that the decision was
not applicable to their household at all (for example for house-
holds with no livestock certain livestock-related decisions
might not apply). This resulted in a code of N/A for both hus-
band and wife decision-making authority.
(i) Comparing spousal reports of decision-making authority
We ﬁrst explore determinants of men’s reported allocation of
authority to their wives Wi[Hi] across the thirteen decisions.
Reported authority is measured on a scale from 0–10, according
to the number of beans allocated by each spouse to themselves
and their spouse. We consider four groups of variables: wife-
speciﬁc characteristics and assets; household and farm shared
assets; husband/wife attribute and asset diﬀerences; and regional
eﬀects that capture some ethnic diﬀerences. Descriptive statistics
for key explanatory variables are summarized in Table 1.
Wife-speciﬁc characteristics and assets are measured by the
wife’s age, years of education, health (1 = very poor to 5 = very
good), and the number of labor hours she reports spending
workingon the farm, in themarket, and at home in a typical day.
Household shared assets include an overall asset score com-
puted as a 100-point scale assigning weights to diﬀerent assets
owned by the household, including the wall material of the
respondent’s home, the ﬂoor material of the best room in the
house, the main rooﬁng material, a description of the number
of rooms and household furniture, household sanitation facili-
ties, agricultural assets, cooking implements, power and light-
ing, and other household items. In addition, we use a proxy
for household community standing, in which the male head of
household places himself on a ten-rung ladder representing his
relative standing in the community. We further consider other
theoretically important household attributes including total
acres of land cultivated, the distance to a paved road, and
whether or not the household has any children under age ten.
Regional eﬀects are captured through dummy variables for
seven administrative regions: Eastern, Central, Southern
Highlands, Lake Northern, Southern, and Western (with East-
ern omitted from the regression models). These are included to
capture variation arising from unmeasured diﬀerences in social
norms (especially to the extent that they reﬂect religious and
ethnic group clusters potentially impacting women’s authority
(Mabsout & Staveren, 2010)), as well as variation in farming
practices, exposure to foreign programs and communities,
etc. Estimates from the Tanzania Demographic and Health
Survey (TDHS) suggest considerable variation among regions
across several key indicators including measures of empower-
ment such as the wife’s participation in decisions (deﬁned as
the sole or joint decision-maker) in the woman’s own health
care, in major household purchases, and in visiting family, rel-
atives and friends (Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey
(TDHS), 2010).The resulting ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression for the wife’s authority as reported by the husband
in household i and in region j takes the form:
Table 1. Summary of variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wife-speciﬁc characteristics and assets
Wife Age—in years 1851 37.407 10.846 18 80
Wife Education—in years 1851 1.883 0.657 1 7
Wife Health—personal rating from very good (5) to poor(1) 1851 3.987 0.784 1 5
Wife Farm Labor—hours in typical day 1850 4.233 1.971 0 12
Wife Market Labor—hours in typical day 1836 3.813 2.467 0 12
Wife Home Labor—hours in typical day 1851 4.926 2.491 0 12
Household shared assets
HH Asset Index—100 point scale increasing in asset ownership 1851 23.579 8.774 0 80
Husband’s Community Standing—10 is highest 1851 4.470 1.602 1 10
HH Land Cultivated—in acres 1851 42.793 41.237 0 150
HH Distance to Pavement—in kilometers 1778 6.178 8.149 0.02 80
HH Children < Age 10 = 1 if any children < age 10 1851 0.621 0.485 0 1
Spousal diﬀerences (husband—wife)
Age Diﬀerence—in years 1851 8.214 6.940 25 44
Education Diﬀerence—in years 1826 0.146 0.727 5 5
Health Diﬀerence—5 point scale 1851 0.061 0.971 4 3
Farm Labor Diﬀerence—in hours 1851 0.590 2.536 12 10
Market Labor Diﬀerence—in hours 1851 0.473 2.896 12 10
Home Labor Diﬀerence—in hours 1851 3.308 2.835 12 6
Regional eﬀects
Eastern 1851 0.145 0.352 0 1
Central 1851 0.034 0.181 0 1
Southern Highlands 1851 0.135 0.342 0 1
Lake 1851 0.128 0.334 0 1
Northern 1851 0.163 0.369 0 1
Southern 1851 0.205 0.404 0 1
Western 1851 0.185 0.389 0 1
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þ b3SPOUSEij þ b4ZONEj þ eij ð1Þ
where WIFE is a vector of wife-speciﬁc characteristics in
household i, HOUSEHOLD is a vector of household assets
(shared by the wife and her husband), SPOUSE is a vector
of husband assets relative to the wife represented as the diﬀer-
ence in wife and husband responses to individual asset-related
questions within a given household, and ZONE is a series of
dummy variables controlling for regional eﬀects associated
with each Tanzanian zone j.
(ii) Intra-household accord over decision-making authority
We then test whether aggregate male/female agreement on
the share of decision-making authority accurately represents
husband/wife accord (measured by the diﬀerence in wives’
and husbands’ reports of women’s decision-making authority,
ranging from -10 to + 10 beans for each question). To analyze
accord by decision, we use the diﬀerence between the wife’s
authority as reported by the husband and the wife’s self-
reported authority, or Wi[Hi]  Wi[Wi]. 6 We next use logistic
regression to predict the probability of accord for each house-
hold decision controlling for demographic covariates available
from the survey data and hypothesized to be associated with
intra-household decision-making and accord.
An initial logistic equation was speciﬁed at the household
level for each decision as:
Where :
If jWi½Hi Wi½Wij < 2; Accordi ¼ 1
Else Accordi ¼ 0
 ð2ÞLog½PðAccordijÞ=ð1 PðAccordijÞ
¼ b0 þ b1WIFEij þ b2HOUSEHOLDij þ b3SPOUSEij
þ b4ZONEj þ uij ð3Þ
Variable deﬁnitions are identical to those in Eq. (1). Coeﬃ-
cients on all variables reﬂect the increase in the log odds like-
lihood that the household with the applicable characteristic
will be in accord (|Wi[Hi]  Wi[Wi]| < 2) for a given decision.
In the ﬁnal analysis we restructure the data in long form such
that each decision within a household is assigned the character-
istics of that household, resulting in a household-decision data-
set where each household appears 13 times, once for each
decision question asked of that household. With this long-
form dataset the ﬁnal regression models are represented as:
Log½PðAccordijkÞ=ð1 PðAccordijkÞ
¼ b0 þ b1WIFEijk þ b2HOUSEHOLDijk þ b3SPOUSEijk
þb5ZONEjk þ b6DECISIONk þ vijk
ð4Þ
After clustering by zone and question, this data structure
allows us to systematically test the eﬀects of each decision k
on the probability of accord, controlling for household char-
acteristics.4. RESULTS
Our ﬁrst set of estimations adds to earlier ﬁndings on
decision-making authority as seen from the perspective of
one spouse, but looks across multiple decisions for the same
household. Additionally, we examine whether which spouse
174 WORLD DEVELOPMENTis surveyed matters, as evidenced by diﬀerent perceptions of
authority by spouses over diﬀerent decisions.
(i) Predicting wife’s authority as a function of wife and
household characteristics
Table 2 and Table 3 show the results of OLS regression
models predicting the authority (number of beans out of 10
possible) allocated to wives by their husbands (Wi[Hi], Table 2)
and to husbands by their wives (Hi[Wi], Table 3) across 13
farm and household decisions, as a function of the wife’s assets
and household characteristics. These results are summarized in
Table 4, where the shading of each cell indicates whether the
signiﬁcance and sign for the estimates for the husband allocat-
ing beans to his wife is diﬀerent (light or dark gray) or the
same (white or black) as the estimates in the same regression
run on the wife’s allocation of beans to herself. Cells shaded
in light gray are signiﬁcant predictors of the number of beans
allocated to the wife by her husband (Wi[Hi]). Cells shaded in
dark gray are signiﬁcant predictors of the number of beans
that the wife allocates to herself (Wi[Wi]) (these model results
are not shown, but are available in the data Appendix). White
(unshaded) cells are not signiﬁcant in either estimation.
Finally, cells shaded in black are signiﬁcant predictors of the
allocation of authority in both husband and wife allocations
of intra-household authority.
Variables signiﬁcantly associated with the wife’s authority
over farm and household decisions as perceived by both hus-
band and wife include the wife’s age (higher authority), the
number of hours that the wife works on the farm (higher
authority), the husband’s community standing (lower author-
ity), the diﬀerence in the number of hours worked in the home
between the husband and wife (higher authority as the hus-
band works more at home or the wife works less at home)
and the zone where the household is located (relative to the
eastern zone, wives on average in the southern zone have more
authority; the eﬀect of other zonal variables varies by deci-
sion). The wife’s authority over farm decisions and cash (Mod-
els (1) to (5)) is most associated with wife-speciﬁc attributes
and assets such as her age and education (both increasing
the wife’s authority over crop and cash decisions in the eyes
of both husband and wife). In contrast, authority over innova-
tion decisions (Models (8) to (11)) such as the purchase of new
seed or farm tools is more strongly associated with household
and spousal characteristics including household assets (with
more assets generally decreasing the wife’s authority as
reported by the husband, but in the case of seed purchases
increasing the wife’s self-reported authority) and diﬀerences
in the husband’s and wife’s health and labor activities (the wife
having less authority as the husband becomes relatively
healthier and/or more active in farm labor and less active in
home labor).
For decisions about children (Models (6) and (7)) and gen-
eral farm (Model (12)) and household (Model (13)) authority,
a diverse combination of wife-speciﬁc, household-speciﬁc,
spousal and regional variables all appear to play a part, with
some interesting ﬁndings. For example, the ﬁnding that
increasing distance to a paved road is associated with more
authority allocated to wives over key marketing and food deci-
sions may reﬂect fewer market and food options in rural areas,
thus rendering the question of ‘‘who decides?” less important
(resulting in a more even sharing of reported authority
between spouses). The ﬁnding that higher community standing
as reported by the husband is associated with lower authority
for the wife over cash, seed purchases, and general farm and
household decision-making may be driven by a husband’sself-reported standing in the community being similar to his
self-assessment of the allocation of authority he holds within
his household.
There are also noteworthy diﬀerences in predictors of the
wife’s authority depending on who is asked (the husband or
the wife) and on the decision itself. In terms of spousal
responses, the husband’s perception of the wife’s authority
(in light gray in Table 4) for several questions was additionally
inﬂuenced by the wife’s health, home labor, distance to a
paved road and the presence of children in the household.
The wife’s description of her own authority (in dark gray)
meanwhile was more strongly related to her education, health,
farm size, and farm and market labor participation (especially
relative to her husband). On average, higher participation in
farm labor is associated with women allocating themselves
higher authority for cropping decisions, children’s schooling,
and training, but appears to constrain their self-reported
authority over purchases of inputs. Higher participation in
market labor is associated with higher wife authority over crop
sales decisions (as reported by both wives and husbands), but
lower overall authority in the household (as reported by wives,
but not by husbands). The absolute number of hours that the
wife works in the home is only signiﬁcant in the husband’s
allocation of authority to his wife; it is not a signiﬁcant predic-
tor of the wife’s perception of her own authority.
Another striking ﬁnding is that the presence of young chil-
dren in the household—though associated with a relatively
large increase in a wife’s overall authority as allocated by
her husband (Model (13))—is also associated with a lower wife
authority for several speciﬁc decisions, including decisions
about what crops to grow and where to sell them (Models
(1) and (2)) and whether to invest in assets and training (Mod-
els (9) to (11)). Surprisingly, the presence of young children in
the household is also associated with lower wife authority as
allocated by the husband for decisions on what foods to feed
the family and children’s schooling (Models (7) and (8)). In the
latter case, women also allocate less authority to themselves
around these decisions, perhaps suggesting that the presence
of young children constrains women’s active participation in
household decision-making. Alternately, this pattern may
again suggest that husbands and wives in our sample were
more likely to assign higher authority to wives over less impor-
tant (or more abstract) decisions, such as family nutrition and
children’s schooling decisions in households with no young
children.
Lastly, diﬀerences in age or education level between hus-
bands and wives are not generally associated with allocations
of authority, but perhaps not surprisingly for farm house-
holds, health diﬀerences, and diﬀerences in labor input are.
On average, men rate themselves about half a point higher
than women in health on a 5-point scale. The regression coef-
ﬁcients in Table 2 thus suggest that as husbands rate them-
selves as increasingly healthy relative to their wives, their
allocation of authority to wives decreases across a range of
decisions. Moreover, both men and women show this tendency
for several key decisions, suggesting that relative health status
may be a strong predictor of household authority. Farm labor
diﬀerences also matter: on average men allocate 0.6 hours
more per day to farm labor than their wives, but as a wife’s
relative farm labor input rises (perhaps implying a lack of
alternative income sources), the husband’s allocation of
authority to her, especially around innovation decisions,
decreases. Diﬀerences in home labor also aﬀect allocations
of authority. The average home labor diﬀerence is strongly
negative (with the wife contributing more home labor than
the husband), thus the coeﬃcient estimates suggest that a
Table 2. OLS results—number of beans allocated to wives by husbands (Wi[Hi]) by decision as a function of wife assets and relative spousal attributes
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Farm decisions and cash Children Innovation Livelihood versus
overall
What crops
to grow
Where to
sell crops
When to sell
livestock
How to use cash
from crops
How to use cash
from livestock
What foods to
feed family
Children’s
schooling
Whether to
buy new seed
Whether to
buy tools
What training
needed
Who attends
training
Farm
generally
Overall
authority
Wife Age 0.007** 0.007* 0.012** 0.010*** 0.010* 0.007* 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.008* 0.010*** 0.007*
Wife Education 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.034*** 0.041** 0.005 0.015 0.013 0.017 0.026* 0.016 0.024** 0.021
Wife Health 0.053 0.141** 0.172** 0.093 0.100 0.048 0.03 0.027 0.163** 0.166** 0.268*** 0.015 0.107
Wife Farm Labor 0.049** 0.064** 0.016 0.012 0.046 0.074*** 0.053* 0.002 0.019 0.000 0.052 0.043* 0.048*
Wife Market Labor 0.008 0.018 0.024 0.043* 0.015 0.045 0.028 0.003 0.010 0.026 0.038 0.004 0.028
Wife Home Labor 0.025 0.055* 0.050 0.084*** 0.032 0.054* 0.078** 0.050* 0.057** 0.093*** 0.047 0.093*** 0.098***
HH Asset Index 0.011*** 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.008* 0.008** 0.000 0.009* 0.015*** 0.003 0.008*
Husband’s Community Standing 0.024 0.076*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.097*** 0.043 0.032 0.064*** 0.071*** 0.018 0.005 0.056*** 0.090***
HH Land Cultivated 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.008** 0.007** 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.006* 0.003
HH Distance Pavement 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002** 0.001 0.001* 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.002**
HH Children < Age 10 0.128* 0.251*** 0.071 0.110 0.085 0.199** 0.143* 0.082 0.209*** 0.206** 0.241** 0.086 0.156*
Age Diﬀerence 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.011* 0.009 0.002 0.002
Education Diﬀerence 0.015 0.054 0.051 0.034 0.060 0.067 0.055 0.018 0.013 0.075 0.052 0.054 0.055
Health Diﬀerence 0.084* 0.034 0.014 0.017 0.019 0.135** 0.111** 0.118** 0.022 0.008 0.019 0.069* 0.034
Farm Labor Diﬀerence 0.008 0.063*** 0.034 0.016 0.016 0.027 0.007 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.054*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.002
Market Labor Diﬀerence 0.020 0.000 0.004 0.025 0.007 0.015 0.042* 0.004 0.013 0.012 0.003 0.007 0.02
Home Labor Diﬀerence 0.029 0.049** 0.057** 0.090*** 0.073*** 0.079*** 0.055** 0.016 0.064*** 0.072*** 0.049* 0.071*** 0.102***
Eastern -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted-
Central 0.297* 0.421** 0.428* 0.902*** 0.583** 0.584*** 0.256 0.083 0.068 0.401* 0.100 0.168 0.449**
Southern Highlands 0.000 0.005 0.070 0.097 0.165 0.541*** 0.036 0.160 0.318** 0.090 0.299* 0.048 0.293*
Lake 0.102 0.059 0.114 0.271** 0.141 0.039 0.142 0.307*** 0.050 0.062 0.369** 0.065 0.053
Northern 0.046 0.005 0.144 0.179 0.020 0.159 0.194 0.122 0.094 0.045 0.328** 0.221** 0.027
Southern 0.410*** 0.267** 0.217 0.261** 0.177 0.312** 0.248* 0.448*** 0.434*** 0.266* 0.639*** 0.408*** 0.343**
Western 0.121 0.004 0.212 0.159 0.16 0.118 0.432*** 0.251** 0.082 0.175 0.444*** 0.11 0.082
Constant 3.518*** 3.703*** 3.257*** 3.692*** 3.416*** 3.739*** 3.799*** 4.344*** 3.291*** 3.412*** 3.125*** 3.870*** 2.773***
R-squared 0.051 0.054 0.047 0.072 0.049 0.061 0.043 0.051 0.068 0.05 0.071 0.072 0.052
N 1750 1719 1436 1720 1429 1746 1681 1715 1736 1568 1448 1755 1745
Notes: All regressions control for the sample weight and strata. Diﬀerences are always calculated as [Husband response  Wife response]. A positive coeﬃcient on a diﬀerence variable implies that as
the husband’s response increases relative to the wife’s, or as the wife’s response decreases relative to the husband’s, the number of beans allocated to the wife increases.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 3. OLS results—number of beans allocated to wives by themselves (Wi[Wi]) by decision as a function of wife assets and relative spousal attributes
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Farm decisions and cash Children Innovation Livelihood versus
overall
What crops
to grow
Where to
sell crops
When to sell
livestock
How to use cash
from crops
How to use cash
from livestock
What foods to
feed family
Children’s
schooling
Whether to
buy new seed
Whether to
buy tools
What training
needed
Who attends
training
Farm
generally
Overall
authority
Wife Age 0.002 0.015*** 0.007 0.010*** 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.007** 0.010** 0.001 0.006* 0.015***
Wife Education 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.029** 0.032* 0.010 0.034** 0.000 0.001 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.033**
Wife Health 0.106* 0.043 0.015 0.030 0.029 0.185** 0.055 0.111 0.031 0.116 0.054 0.076 0.164**
Wife Farm Labor 0.086*** 0.012 0.056* 0.010 0.081** 0.049 0.058** 0.059** 0.060** 0.100*** 0.062* 0.029 0.121***
Wife Market Labor 0.001 0.054* 0.076** 0.040 0.007 0.023 0.038 0.035 0.024 0.022 0.039 0.014 0.068**
Wife Home Labor 0.033 0.028 0.051 0.023 0.015 0.020 0.014 0.014 0.027 0.028 0.055 0.011 0.030
HH Asset Index 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.009* 0.007 0.007* 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.004
Husband’s Community Standing 0.005 0.018 0.028 0.046* 0.047 0.020 0.047* 0.055** 0.004 0.005 0.053 0.056** 0.071***
HH Land Cultivated 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.007* 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.007**
HH Distance Pavement 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003*** 0.002** 0.001 0.002** 0.000 0.002* 0.000 0.000
HH Children < Age 10 0.022 0.102 0.082 0.093 0.023 0.037 0.179** 0.091 0.062 0.035 0.120 0.033 0.042
Age Diﬀerence 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.012* 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.003
Education Diﬀerence 0.030 0.005 0.005 0.029 0.054 0.103* 0.064 0.038 0.002 0.034 0.046 0.017 0.028
Health Diﬀerence 0.128*** 0.102* 0.135** 0.066 0.039 0.153** 0.040 0.110** 0.067 0.056 0.159** 0.030 0.055
Farm Labor Diﬀerence 0.041** 0.004 0.003 0.021 0.078*** 0.030 0.034 0.038* 0.005 0.001 0.039 0.001 0.077***
Market Labor Diﬀerence 0.010 0.003 0.055** 0.011 0.012 0.007 0.029 0.022 0.017 0.001 0.045* 0.009 0.040**
Home Labor Diﬀerence 0.000 0.007 0.005 0.013 0.033 0.044 0.013 0.011 0.045** 0.042 0.044 0.038* 0.062***
Eastern -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted- -omitted-
Central 0.105 0.179 0.319 0.037 0.215 0.930*** 0.431* 0.532*** 0.504*** 0.195 0.020 0.368* 0.612***
Southern Highlands 0.189 0.331** 0.336* 0.241 0.236 0.374** 0.232 0.243 0.456*** 0.369** 0.369** 0.403*** 0.028
Lake 0.193 0.218 0.018 0.179 0.072 0.069 0.620*** 0.229* 0.364*** 0.143 0.627*** 0.311** 0.276**
Northern 0.200* 0.268** 0.225 0.022 0.007 0.295* 0.700*** 0.781*** 0.539*** 0.075 0.075 0.394*** 0.086
Southern 0.280*** 0.305** 0.213 0.091 0.136 0.472*** 0.683*** 0.533*** 0.455*** 0.338** 0.213 0.520*** 0.345***
Western 0.163 0.221* 0.513*** 0.235** 0.597*** 0.312** 0.671*** 0.540*** 0.373*** 0.038 0.157 0.461*** 0.271**
Constant 4.277*** 2.968*** 3.732*** 3.350*** 3.435*** 4.644*** 3.905*** 4.174*** 3.241*** 2.541*** 3.921*** 3.867*** 1.896***
R-squared 0.022 0.037 0.033 0.027 0.038 0.041 0.048 0.047 0.033 0.030 0.040 0.029 0.064
N 1754 1705 1483 1709 1481 1741 1687 1710 1722 1526 1420 1752 1729
Notes: All regressions control for the sample weight and strata. Diﬀerences are always calculated as [Husband response  Wife response]. A positive coeﬃcient on a diﬀerence variable implies that as
the husband’s response increases relative to the wife’s, or as the wife’s response decreases relative to the husband’s, the number of beans allocated to the wife increases.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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ference becomes a smaller negative number, with the husband
contributing more to home labor relative to the wife, or the
wife contributing less relative to the husband) the wife’s
authority increases for most decisions. In other words, more
equal home labor input appears to be associated with higher
decision-making authority for women–although we cannot tell0 1 2
Overall household
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Who attends training
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Buy new seeds
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Figure 1. Beans allocated to wives, averages by husbands Wi[Hi] and by wives W
diﬀerences using unpaired t-tests. *p
Table 4. Summary OLS results—signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for beans allocated to wi
by decisif more equitable spousal labor allocations are the cause of, or
the result of, relative authority.
Together the above models indicate, consistent with the
published literature on intra-household negotiation, that
women’s authority within the household is shaped by her char-
acteristics and assets (both absolutely and relative to her hus-
band), as well as by household-level attributes such as overall3 4 5 6
Wife decision scores 
by husband W[H]
Wife decision scores 
by wife W[W]
***
***
***
**
**
**
***
i[Wi] by decision Mean out of 10 beans, with standard errors and signiﬁcant
< 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
ves by husbands (Wi[Hi]) or beans allocated to wives by themselves Wi[Wi]
ion
178 WORLD DEVELOPMENTsocioeconomic status and regional characteristics such as vari-
ation in farming systems and traditional practices. Moreover
these models also provide strong evidence that the processes
by which husbands allocate authority to their wives and the
processes by which wives allocate authority to themselves dif-
fer depending upon both the characteristics of the husbands
and wives and upon the characteristics of the questions being
asked.
(ii) Allocation of authority within households: accord between
husbands and wives
Our subsequent set of estimations uses spousal accord–a
measure of the degree to which the husband’s allocation of
authority to the wife (Wi[Hi]) and the wife’s allocation of
authority to herself (Wi[Wi]) reﬂect intra-household agreement
on relative decision-making authority–to highlight decisions
where spousal perspective matters for intra-household
decision-making dynamics.
Figure 1 summarizes the average amount of decision-
making authority attributed to women as reported by men
for each of the 13 questions in our data. With the exception
of what foods to feed the family, on average nearly all ofTable 5. Intra-household accord (Wi[Hi]  Wi[
Decision variable Obs. Mean accord
Wi[Hi]  Wi[Wi]
Std. Dev. Min
Crops cultivated 1844 0.009 1.628 10
Where to sell crops 1777 0.187 1.867 9
When to sell livestock 1444 0.096 1.920 9
Cash spending (crops) 1784 0.134 1.825 8
Cash spending (livestock) 1443 0.150 2.046 10
Food to feed family 1830 0.128 2.101 8
Schooling 1739 0.001 1.887 9
Buy new seeds 1768 0.000 0.043 9
Buy new equipment 1806 0.131 0.040 9
Types info. needed 1528 0.122 2.078 9
Who attends training 1385 0.022 2.281 10
Farm generally 1848 0.175 1.660 9
Overall household 1814 0.302 1.962 7
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Figure 2. Intra-household accord (Wi[Hi]  Wi[Wi]) on authority over
‘‘farm decisions generally”.the decision-making variables appear to fall predominantly
in the domain of the husband (that is, out of 10 beans less than
5, and often less than 4, beans on average are attributed to
wives). At ﬁrst glance men’s and women’s reports of
decision-making authority appear surprisingly consistent–the
diﬀerence in average reports by men and the average reports
by women rarely approaches even one ﬁfth of one bean, with
mean diﬀerences for men’s and women’s reports on six out of
the 13 questions not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
A few things stand out from these averages. There is little
evidence of women substantially under-reporting their
decision-making authority relative to men’s reports. Women’s
under-reporting of their own authority is a pattern that has
been noted in numerous past quantitative and qualitative stud-
ies (Becker et al., 2006). More consistent with previous
research, Figure 1 highlights one decision where women con-
sistently have relatively more authority than other decisions–
what foods to feed the family. Even for this decision, however,
women do not have more authority than men, and at most are
perceived to share it equally (mean Wi[Hi] = 4.86; mean
Wi[Wi] = 4.99).
When we examine the allocations of authority across
spouses, however, the results look quite diﬀerent. Namely,
aggregate responses across men and women appear to mask
substantial household-level diﬀerences between the reports of
husbands and wives–producing misleading conclusions about
the general level of intra-household accord in a population.
To capture variation in husband and wife responses to individ-
ual decision-making questions we deﬁne the level of accord for
a given decision as: the level of wife authority reported by her
husband Wi[Hi] minus the level of wife authority reported by
the wife herself Wi[Wi]. Denoted as Wi[Hi]  Wi[Wi] this
household decision-level accord variable ranges from + 10 if
a husband in household i thought a particular decision was
entirely in the wife’s domain and the wife thought it was
entirely in the husband’s domain (potentially reﬂecting neglect
or indecision on the issue), to 0 if the husband and wife agreed
on who held decision-making authority, to -10 if both husband
and wife thought the decision was in their own domain alone
(reﬂecting potential conﬂict over decision-making authority).
Note that since all spouses were given 10 beans to allocate,
it does not matter whether we use the number of beans allo-
cated to husbands or wives–the diﬀerence is identical.Wi]) means and variability across decisions
Max t-Test of
mean = 0
% Discord (>1 bean) % Discord (>2 beans)
8 0.229 63 29
8 4.219*** 66 34
9 1.905* 64 34
7 3.100*** 66 35
10 2.793*** 67 37
7 2.604*** 68 39
9 0.013 60 33
7 0.000 62 31
7 3.313*** 64 31
9 2.302** 64 38
10 0.353 65 41
8 4.526*** 64 30
9 6.557*** 68 40
HUSBAND AND WIFE PERSPECTIVES ON FARM HOUSEHOLD DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY 179As illustrated in Figure 2, there was a great deal of variation
in the distribution of intra-household accord for the diﬀerent
decisions, including on the question of general farm
decision-making authority.
As further shown in Table 5, looking across all of the deci-
sions, such husband/wife disagreements are widespread. Dif-
ferences in perceptions range up to a seven bean or more on
all questions, and mean accord scores are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero for nine out of the 13 decisions.
The most signiﬁcant discord in reported decision-making
authority was for broad areas of household activity (for exam-
ple responsibility for general farm decisions, or for decisions in
the household overall) and for cash-related questions, such as
cropping, sales, and equipment purchase decisions. Almost all
signiﬁcant relationships involve husbands reporting more
authority for their wives than wives report for themselves
(implying possible neglect of these decisions, with both hus-
bands and wives attributing more authority to the other than
the other attributes to him or herself). Interestingly, the deci-
sion on what foods to feed the family was the only one of
the thirteen decisions for which a hypothesis that the diﬀerence
between husbands and wives was less than zero could not be
rejected (t = 2.604; p < 0.005), implying both husbands
and wives claimed more authority than was acknowledged
by the spouse.
(iii) Predicting accord as a function of household characteristics
To simplify the presentation of results, the ordinal accord
variables were transformed into dichotomous variables, with
households classiﬁed as either in accord (with spousal alloca-Table 6. Logistic regression results for intra-household accord (|Wi[Hi]  W
attributes (marg
Notes: All regressions control for the sample weight and strata. Diﬀerences a
coeﬃcient on a diﬀerence variable implies that as the husband’s response increa
husband’s, the likelihood of accord increases.
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.tions of authority reﬂecting less than a diﬀerence of two beans)
(|Wi[Hi]  Wi[Wi]| <2) or not in accord (with the diﬀerence in
spousal allocation of authority of +2 beans or greater, or 2
beans or less.
Table 6 reports the marginal eﬀects from logistic regression
for all questions with this binary dependent variable. Given
the cross-sectional nature of our data, these covariates should
be interpreted as the association between spousal and house-
hold characteristics and accord, since we are unable to deal
with possible endogeneity. We again report independent vari-
ables in four categories: wife speciﬁc assets (age, education,
health, and labor); household assets and attributes (shared
household assets, landholdings, distance from road, and the
presence of children under 10); spousal diﬀerences (diﬀerences
in age, education, health, and labor); and regional eﬀects.
Among signiﬁcant predictors of accord, wife-speciﬁc charac-
teristics are particularly important. Self-reports of decision-
making authority by older, more educated wives more closely
match their husband’s reports. The eﬀect of wife health on
accord depends upon the decision: relatively healthier wives
are more likely to agree with their husbands on the allocation
of authority over schooling decisions (Model (7)), but more
likely to disagree with their husbands over who holds author-
ity for farm decisions in general (Model (12)). More hours of
home labor for the wife is also associated with less accord
between her and her husband over the allocation of
decision-making authority over several farming and household
decisions (Models (3), (4), (8), and (13)).
Household shared assets and attributes, as a group, were the
variables most strongly and consistently associated with the
probability of accord. Havingmore assets and a higher commu-i[Wi]| < 2) by decision as a function of wife assets and relative spousal
inal eﬀects)
re always calculated as [Husband response  Wife response]. A positive
ses relative to the wife’s, or as the wife’s response decreases relative to the
Table 7. Logistic regression for accord (|Wijk[Hijk]—Wijk[Wijk]| < 2) as
a function of household and decision characteristics (marginal eﬀects,
clustered by household and decision)
180 WORLD DEVELOPMENTnity standing (as reported by the husband) both decrease the
probability of accord over several diﬀerent farming, innovation,
and general farm/household decisions. Inversely, being further
from a paved road was almost universally associated with an
increase in the probability of accord. Together these results sug-
gest that more marginal households are likely to have greater
accord, all else being equal. It is unclear whether these results
derive from lower costs of negotiating authority in households
that simply have fewer options, or whether households with
fewer decision options are a result of accord–recognizing that
accord can derive from autocratic husbands and abstaining
wives adhering to shared gender norms.
Age and educational diﬀerences between husbands and
wives were relatively weak predictors of accord for most deci-
sions, however the relative health of wives versus their hus-
bands is a signiﬁcant predictor of accord over some key
farming decisions, with less healthy wives less likely to agree
with their healthier husbands.
Finally, among regional eﬀects, relative to the Eastern zone,
the Central and Southern zones tend to have lower accord
across most farm and market decisions, while the Southern
Highlands and Western Zone tend to have a higher incidence
of accord, particularly for decisions involving innovation and
general/overall farm and household authority. The only deci-
sion for which there is no signiﬁcant regional variation in
accord is for who holds authority over children’s schooling
(Model (7)).
Together the models in Table 6 clearly show that the relative
signiﬁcance and importance of spousal and household charac-
teristics varies by decision, thus implying that other factors,
including characteristics of the decisions themselves, may
aﬀect the probability of accord.Notes: All regressions control for sample weight and strata. Diﬀerences are
calculated as [Husband response]  [Wife response].
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.(iv) Predicting accord as a function of household and decision
characteristics
Our ﬁnal logistic regression model, as shown in Table 7, pre-
dicts the probability of intra-household accord as a function of
both household and decision characteristics using a long-form
household x decision dataset (n = 22,815 household x decision
observations). The binary outcome variable is again the pres-
ence or absence of accord, with accord = 1 if the spousal
allocation of authority for a given decision within a
given household reﬂects less than a diﬀerence of two beans
(|Wi[Hi]  Wi[Wi]| < 2), otherwise accord = 0, suggesting the
lack of a common understanding of the division of authority
within the household for that decision. The decision on ‘‘what
crops to grow” is omitted from the model, such that the results
for the other twelve decisions are relative to the likelihood of
accord on this decision. These results support the earlier ﬁnd-
ings that the likelihood of accord varies by decision type, after
controlling for household characteristics.
Looking across all 13 farm and household decisions simulta-
neously, more educated wives and wives with better health
(relative to their husbands) are associated with a higher likeli-
hood of accord over household decisions. Accord is also pos-
itively associated with more acres of landholdings and greater
distance to paved roads. Conversely, in households where
wives spend more time engaged in market labor accord is less
likely. Wealthier households (as measured by assets) and
households with a higher husband’s community standing are
also less likely to be in accord.
As for the eﬀects of decisions themselves on intra-household
accord, controlling for household characteristics, accord over
decision-making is relatively more likely for highly visible
farm and household decisions including decisions onchildren’s schooling, general farm decisions, as well as for
specialized decisions on whether to buy new seed or buy new
tools (all not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the reference decision
category, what crops to grow). All other decisions, especially
those involving how to use cash from crops and livestock
and who holds overall authority in the household, are associ-
ated with discord, even after controlling for wife characteris-
tics, household assets, and spousal diﬀerences.
It is speculative exactly what the speciﬁc decision covariates
are reﬂecting. Our results, however, appear consistent with the
hypothesis that more privately appropriable beneﬁts (such as
cash decisions, or who attends trainings) as well as more
diﬃcult-to-monitor outcomes (such as what types of training
are needed) may align with a greater probability of discord
over the allocation of decision-making authority. More
diﬃcult-to-deﬁne decisions such as ‘‘overall household author-
ity” (a phrase which each spouse might interpret quite diﬀer-
ently) may also have a greater likelihood of discordant
spousal reports.
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We believe this research makes several contributions. Using
original data from 1,851 Tanzanian households, we ﬁnd that
the intra-household allocation of decision-making authority
cannot be explained by household demographic characteristics
alone. That is, the rules of decision-making are not uniform
across the board in a given household, but rather the alloca-
tion of authority to wives by husbands (and to husbands by
wives) also varies across decisions within households. More
novel, by exploiting responses by both husbands and wives,
we further ﬁnd that diﬀerent individual and household-level
factors explain variation in the perceived allocation of
decision-making authority for husbands versus wives.
We also demonstrate that aggregate male–female agree-
ment over the allocation of decision-making authority in a
population can indeed overstate husband–wife accord over
the allocation of authority within households. The average
allocations of authority by men and by women in our sample
are almost identical: generally diﬀering by no more than one-
ﬁfth of one bean. In contrast, for husbands and wives, more
than 65% of household spousal allocations diﬀer by one bean
or more, more than 30% diﬀer by two beans or more, and
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in spousal reports for nine
of the thirteen decisions considered in this study. Regardless
of what is viewed as a ‘‘fair” distribution of decision-making
authority, our prior belief based on male–female aggregates–
that the prevailing distribution of authority over farm and
household decisions is similarly understood between hus-
bands and wives–has been challenged. Instead, our data indi-
cate multiple cases where spouses disagree over who holds
authority over diﬀerent decisions, suggesting that valuable
rights over decision-making authority remain incompletely
deﬁned.
These ﬁndings have important methodological implications:
asking both women and men to independently report on their
spouse’s decision-making authority entails signiﬁcant
increases in the costs and complexity of survey collection
and analysis, and as a consequence many past studies have
relied on assumptions that individual responses can be treated
as equivalent to household responses. Our study has tested
such assumptions empirically, using data from husbands and
wives in households where men still hold more power, but
where specialized or shared decision-making is relatively com-
mon. The results suggest widespread disagreement among hus-
bands and wives in rural Tanzanian households, and the
question of ‘‘who is in charge” hinges critically on who is
asked and on the disposition of the spouse who may or may
not agree.
These ﬁndings also have important policy implications. In
addition to highlighting how research based on single-spouse
interviews or a limited number of decisions may lead to erro-
neous conclusions surrounding intra-household decision-
making dynamics, our results also suggest that investing in
women as a means of increasing bargaining power may have
diﬀerential pay-oﬀs depending on the views of each spouse
and on the decision being considered. Women’s education
and women’s health, for example, appear to be positively asso-
ciated with a wife’s allocation of overall household authority
to herself, but not with corresponding allocations of overall
authority by her husband. In contrast, higher women’s educa-
tion is associated with shared spousal views of greater
women’s authority over cash decisions, suggesting investmentsin education may improve women’s bargaining power, but
unevenly so across diﬀerent decision types. The eﬀect of better
women’s health, meanwhile, is associated with an increase
(perceived by both husband and wife) in her authority over
several key farm and household decisions, which ultimately
suggests that, for agricultural populations in particular, one’s
own physical capabilities are a crucial component of bargain-
ing power. 7
This result is reinforced by the signiﬁcance of our labor ﬁnd-
ings: though there is variation across decisions, in general,
more hours spent by a wife working on the farm are associated
with more farm-related decision-making authority. The same
result does not hold for hours the wife spends in market labor,
suggesting that the eﬀects of interventions to increase women’s
participation in market labor in isolation (without increasing
education or other factors related to intra-household negotia-
tions) may not increase wives’ farm and household decision-
making authority. Recognizing the value of collecting both
husband and wife responses in research on important house-
hold resource allocation decisions can help advance methods
for targeting agricultural development interventions to
decision-makers (Doss, 2002; Duﬂo, 2011; Food &
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),
2011; Gilligan, Kumar, McNiven, Meenakshi, &
Quisumbing, 2014; Kilic, Palacios-Lopez, & Goldstein, 2015;
Malapit et al., 2014; Sraboni, Malapit, Quisumbing, &
Ahmed, 2014; van den Bold, Quisumbing, & Gillespie, 2013).
Based on bargaining theory and the results of this research
we can develop some preliminary hypotheses about when and
how diﬀerences in husband and wife views on authority might
matter most. For example, we might expect the diﬃculty and
duration of negotiations over authority to vary with the size
and distribution of the expected beneﬁts and costs of the out-
come. Hence in general, we can expect more diﬃcult negotia-
tions (and likely more discord) over decisions involving greater
payoﬀs, and more privately appropriable goods (for example
cash-related decisions) relative to public household goods
(for example nutrition choices, or investments in children’s
education). The ability to monitor and enforce decision-
making authority is another potentially important factor con-
tributing to whether or not spouses have a common under-
standing of the division of authority. Infrequent and
specialized decisions, such as an annual decision of where to
sell crops or livestock as opposed to a daily decision of what
foods to eat, limit the opportunities for spouses to assess their
shared understanding, and might therefore be associated with
greater discord. Cash-related decisions can be particularly dif-
ﬁcult and costly to monitor, as a rich literature hypothesizes
over seemingly ineﬃcient behavior wives engage in to keep
money out of the hands of male family members (e.g.,
Anderson & Baland, 2002; Schaner, 2011), further increasing
the potential for discordant spousal views. In contrast, large
durable purchases such as equipment tend to be more visible,
and thus spouses might be expected to share a clearer under-
standing of how such decisions surrounding the use of house-
hold resources are made.
Research that collects data on the transaction costs associ-
ated with negotiating and monitoring the allocation of intra-
household authority, along with sampling that includes all
households (not just those with male heads) and identiﬁes
the decision-authority impact of particular investments in
health, education, or labor market interventions, could, we
believe, help test these hypotheses.
182 WORLD DEVELOPMENTNOTES1. We use the word ‘‘authority” as we believe it best reﬂects a share of
power in decision-making that reﬂects our survey and experimental set-up.
2. Malhotra and Schuler (2005) deﬁne women’s empowerment as a
process including increased mobility, access to and control over economic
resources and domestic decision-making.
3. Because household decisions are often repeated, one criticism of non-
co-operative models is that a co-operative outcome should evolve; that is,
spouses should ‘‘ﬁgure out” how to arrive at optimal solutions, especially
for providing household public goods. Evidence, however, suggests the
contrary, with strategic and non-co-operative behavior commonly
observed even in decisions surrounding shared household goods (such as
children’s nutrition and education).
4. We chose to look at the share of authority given to wives, rather than
the share given to husbands, on the assumption that the husband is the
default head of the household and cedes authority to his wife, rather thanthe other way around. Indeed, in our sub-sample of married couples only
rarely is the woman designated as the ‘‘head of household” or primary
decision-maker.
5. Data for the study were collected as a part of the 2010 Farmer Focus
survey conducted by the Agricultural Development Program of the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation.
6. Note that since authority is measured by the share of ten beans that
each spouse accords themselves, this measure of accord is symmetric with
(mirrors) the husband’s self-reported authority and his authority as
reported by the wife.
7. Another possible interpretation of these ﬁndings is that as the
husband’s health worsens relative to the wife—as in the case of HIV/
AIDS infection—the wife’s claim to authority increases. Although our
data do not allow direct testing of this hypothesis, some of the observed
regional eﬀects may reﬂect variation in the regional prevalence of HIV/
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